Agricultural labor productivity differences between the richest and poorest countries are factor of three larger than aggregate productivity differences. In addition, domestically priced intermediate input shares in agriculture differ by a factor of four. I propose a theory in which the under-utilization of intermediate inputs amplifies sector neutral productivity (TFP) differences in the agricultural sector of low income countries. In the face of incomplete markets, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and subsistence requirements, risk averse farmers in poor countries to put relatively more weight on bad potential shock realizations when making input decisions. Relative to a baseline model with no risk, the model predicts that both agricultural and aggregate productivity decrease by 50% in the poorest countries. This result is driven by the fact that the model accounts for 70% percent of the difference in agricultural intermediate input shares between the richest and poorest countries.
Introduction
Differences in agricultural output per worker between the richest and poorest countries are significantly larger than differences in aggregate output per worker (Caselli, 2005) . In spite of this, over 80% of people are employed in agriculture in the poorest countries. Since poor countries employ a large fraction of the population in a particularly unproductive sector, basic accounting suggests that understanding agricultural productivity differences is key in understanding aggregate differences.
One possible explanation for understanding agricultural productivity differences is that farmers in developing countries are using fewer intermediate inputs. Section 2 documents that the domestically priced ratio of intermediate inputs to agricultural output exhibits a strong positive correlation with per capita GDP, ranging from a low of 0.04 in Uganda to 0.40 in the United States. The goal of this paper is to provide a theory to understand the correlation between domestically priced intermediate input shares in agriculture and income levels across countries, and in turn, assess its role for productivity differences across countries.
To do so, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which farm input decisions are made jointly with consumption choices. This implies that farmers do not take profit as given when choosing consumption, consistent with a large empirical literature reviewed by Morduch (1995) . I further assume that farmers face both uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks and subsistence requirements. The inability to insure ex-post consumption creates a deviation from the standard profit maximization problem. Instead of weighting each possible outcome by the probability of occurrence, each outcome is weighted by the product of the probability and the farmer's marginal utility at that realization. As TFP decreases, the farmer's income net of subsistence requirements moves closer to zero. This increases marginal utility at low shock realizations relative to farmers in rich countries. Put more simply, farmers in poor countries become more concerned with the disastrous consequences of bad, but unlikely, shocks. In the model, this generates a "wedge" between profit maximizing marginal value and price of intermediates, even though the Cobb-Douglas farm production technologies differ by only a factor-neutral TFP parameter across countries. When aggregated, this implies that poor countries have both a lower domestically priced intermediate input share and lower labor productivity in agriculture.
To assess the cross-country implications of the mechanics described above, I calibrate the model using a mixture of aggregate and individual level data to replicate key features of agricultural production in developing countries. These features include risky production, for which I use plot level data from six Indian villages from the International Crops Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics Village Level Surveys (ICRISAT VLS) to discipline the distribution of productivity shocks. Relying on previous literature, I further assume that savings is limited to agricultural storage (see, for example Udry, 1995) . Storage turns out to be an incredibly costly way to save, due to insect infestations, molds, and any other number of factors. Using a new set of statistics for agricultural storage depreciation, I find that depreciation rates can be as high as 30%, as it is for maize in Zimbabwe. This limits the ability of agricultural storage to be used as a buffer stock to self-insure against risk. Lastly, I include agricultural-specific price distortions that have been documented extensively in the literature (see Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu, 2008; Vollrath, 2009) The second result deals with the interaction of risk with other distortions present in developing countries. While I show in Section 4 that uninsurable risk is the only distortion needed to theoretically generate a correlation between intermediate input shares and income, it is of course not the only distortion present in poor countries. Other documented distortions include high transportation costs to rural agricultural areas (Adamopoulos, 2011; Gollin and Rogerson, 2010) , or institutional differences that generate unequal wages between sectors (Vollrath, 2009; Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh, 2011) . Most similar to this paper is Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) , who consider the role of price distortions in accounting for intermediate input usage across countries. Quantitatively, I find that the aggregate importance of agricultural risk depends critically on the magnitude of these price distortions in agriculture.
Relative to these studies, this model presents a new margin through which these distortions can impact productivity. Since high prices decrease expected income, farmers limit their exposure to risk by reducing intermediate input usage. This amplification shows up as lower domestically priced intermediate input shares in poor countries, a result that cannot be generated by price distortions alone. Quantitatively, the model increases the prediction of agricultural output per worker differences between the richest and poorest countries by 52% and aggregate output per worker differences by 63% relative to the world with no risk, but the same price distortions. As a comparison, without price distortions the model predicts an increase in agricultural productivty of 5% relative to the no risk version. I further show that even small changes in price distortions can have dramatic effects on agricultural productivity, implying that the welfare and productivity gains from small improvements in, say, roads are being severely underestimated in standard aggregate models.
In addition to the work on price distortions discussed above, other explanations for crosscountry agricultural productivity differences include occupational selection (Lagakos and Waugh, 2010) , distortions limiting farm size (Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2011) , barriers that limit specialization through trade (Tombe, 2011) , and the possibility of mismeasurement (Herrendorf and Schoellman, 2011) . This paper also builds on an empirical literature on agricultural household intermediate input decisions. First, the model is consistent with empirical evidence that households do not make profit maximizing intermediate input choices, as found in Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008) and Zerfu and Larson (2010) . Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) and Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) Hsieh and Klenow (2007) , I show that even at domestic prices, there is still a strong positive correlation between the intermediate good share in agriculture and the GDP per capita across countries.
Domestic Intermediate Input Shares
The domestic intermediate share in agriculture of country j is 
where p * x and p * a are the international prices of intermediates and agricultural output. The difference between (2.1) and (2.2) is only one of prices. While the domestic intermediate share includes any price distortions in the domestic market, the real intermediate share does not. By equations (2.1) and (2.2), it is possible to write the domestic intermediate share as 
Comparison to Manufacturing and Services
One key feature of agriculture is that production occurs during only the few harvesting seasons per year. Not constrained by these natural limitations, manufacturing and service sector firms are free to produce output throughout the year. This gives these firms two advantages in dealing with risk. First, if a "yearly" shock is realized, nonagricultural firms can adjust their input bundles throughout the year to respond to the shock realization.
Because of the limited harvesting opportunities in agriculture, this is not possible. Second, if each production run brings with it an i.i.d. productivity shock, then the law of large numbers implies that simply increasing the number of production runs acts as a kind of insurance. Again, this is not possible in agriculture, because harvesting is limited to the optimal harvesting seasons. These natural production limitations put agricultural firms at a unique disadvantage to cope with production risk. 2 The rest of this paper develops a model to understand the cause of this correlation in agriculture and assess its impact on 2 A constant elasticity of substitution production function with complementarity between capital and intermediate inputs could at least qualitatively deliver this result. If this is the case, then the result can instead be interpreted an amplification mechanism. However, Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008) show that an increase in fertilizer investment would be profitable even without corresponding changes in complimentary agricultural practices. This is the feature highlighted in this paper. 
Model
The model period is a year, and time is discrete and runs t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. There are two sectors, sector a for agriculture and sector m for manufacturing (the manufacturing sector includes all nonagriculture). Throughout, I normalize the output price of the sector m good to p mt = 1 for all t. Within an economy, there is a continuum of villages with measure one and each village contains a measure one of infinitely lived members. As discussed in Townsend (1994) and Ogaki and Zhang (2001) , individuals are relatively well insured against purely idiosyncratic risk. Covariate risk, such as weather, is more difficult to insure against.
Therefore, I assume all decisions are made at the village level.
Looking ahead, part of this paper will investigate the complementarity of production risk and price distortions. Therefore, I lay out the full model here with two distortions based on recent literature. While quantitatively important, I show in Section 4 that these features are not necessary to theoretically generate cross-country differences in intermediate input shares.
Following Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) and Vollrath (2009) are not equated across sectors, due to costs associated with traveling to the city, insufficient skills for manufacturing work, uncertain job prospects, urban-rural cost of living differences, or any other number of factors. These are essentially implicit taxes on manufacturing wages.
To capture this, I model an explicit proportional tax on manufacturing wage income. Tax revenue is rebated back to the village according to the function T (b, z), which is known to the village. This allows me to focus specifically on the marginal distortion caused by wage differences. 
Technology
Manufacturing The manufacturing sector is characterized by a stand-in firm which uses only labor services N mt to produce output according to the production function
where A is a sector neutral TFP parameter. The parameter A is country-specific, and is a measure of the overall productivity of the economy. For each t, the firm chooses N mt to maximize profit
where w t is the wage paid per unit of N mt . In a competitive equilibrium w t = A for all t.
Agriculture Each village is endowed with one farm that requires sector m intermediate inputs x and labor n a . Production occurs according to the decreasing returns to scale production function
where A is, again, sector neutral TFP. The shock z t is a village-specific productivity shock drawn from a time-invariant distribution with c.d.f. Q(z), with support on [z, z] . The realization of z t is i.i.d. with respect to both villages and time, and E(z t ) = 1.
Village
A village values consumption from both sectors a and m, and maximizes total expected village utility given by
with discount factor β < 1. The period t utility flow takes the form
where c jt is consumption from sector j ∈ {a, m} andā > 0 is subsistence requirement of the agricultural good. This assumption plays an important role in this analysis, and is discussed further in Section 3.3.1 after detailing the decision problem.
Decision Timing
At time t − 1, the village chooses to save b t units of the agricultural good. A fraction δ depreciates, and the village enters time t with (1 − δ)b t units of savings. This δ is allowed to vary across economies to capture differences in savings technologies across countries. The period t decision problem of a village is broken down into two stages denoted planting and harvesting, which are separated by the realization of the idiosyncratic shock z.
In the planting stage, each village chooses intermediates x t to use in their farm. A unit of x can be purchased for a price p x ≥ 1. This price is allowed to differ across countries but not time. Note that the assumption here is that there exists a technology that turns one unit of manufacturing output into 1/p x units of intermediate input. Thus, 1/p x defines the productivity of this technology relative to manufacturing output production.
Then, z t is realized. Recall that this shock is i.i.d. across villages and time. This is assumed for two reasons. First, rainfall is the primary source of income fluctuations in agrarian life. Since the model period is chosen to be a year, it is reasonable to assume the shock is i.i.d.. Second, in Bewley models such as this, the ability to self insure decreases as the persistence of the shock increases. In this sense, I am giving the village the best possible chance to self insure by assuming z t is i.i.d..
Turning to the harvesting stage, the village decides how to allocate labor between the agricultural sector, where they can work on a farm, and the manufacturing sector, where they can work for wage w t . Profits are made, and consumption and savings choices (c at , c mt , b t+1 ) take place. This timing is assumed to capture the fact that off-farm labor is an important form of insurance for farmers (Kochar, 1999; Ito and Kurosaki, 2009 ). 
Recursive Problem
The timing described above implies that the village state variable is savings b t , and the aggregate state is the distribution of savings across all villages, denoted µ t (b). Since I will be studying the stationary equilibrium, I suppress the dependence of the decision problem on the aggregate state µ t (b).
At the harvesting stage, once the choice of x is made and z realized, the value of entering
subject to constraint set
where V P is the value of entering the planting stage at t + 1 with b units of savings in the stationary equilibrium. The first constraint is the village budget constraint, and the second captures market incompleteness. Villages cannot borrow or trade claims to state-contingent asset with other villages, even though there would be gains to doing so. The harvesting prob-
Working backwards, the planting stage value of entering time t with b savings is
For future use, aggregate variables will be denoted by capital letters
so that the domestic intermediate input share in agriculture can be written as
This section provides some discussion about two important features of the model: the form of the utility function and the savings technology.
The Role of Subsistence Requirements The period utility function assumed here is a simplified version of that proposed in Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001) . Qualitatively, it has two important features. First, it accounts for Engel's law, so that the fraction of total income spent on agricultural output is decreasing in TFP A. Second, it provides an explanation for what Schultz (1953) calls the "food problem." Countries must produce a certain amount of food to live. Since poor countries are less productive, they must employ a larger fraction of the population in agriculture to produce this critical amount of food. This provides a qualitative answer to why poor countries employ such a large fraction of the population in such an unproductive sector. Quantitatively, Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2009) have shown that a general form of this utility function can replicate well the structural transformation process in the US. In estimating the utility function with the best fit to the data, they find thatā > 0 is necessary to generate a good fit.
Given the empirically consistent predictions of the model, variations on this utility function have become commonplace in modeling the agricultural sector. This paper, however, exploits a feature of this utility function that has yet to be explored in a cross-country framework. Namely, subsistence requirements changes the relative risk aversion of a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. To see this, first define y as the optimal total income at the harvesting stage, given savings b, intermediate choice X, and shock z
Given this y, a village purchases enough to satisfy subsistenceā, then splits the rest of their income between the two sectors based on the relative weights assigned by the price p a and utility parameter α.
Using these decision rules, the utility flow can be written as
where Ω = α log(α) + (1 − α) log(1 − α). The relative risk aversion with respect to total income y, givenā and price p a , is then R(y|ā, p a ) = y y − p aā Ifā = 0, this is a standard log CRRA utility function. However ifā > 0, the utility function instead exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), consistent with the household evidence of Ogaki and Zhang (2001) from both India and Pakistan.
With this form of the period utility function, harvesting utility can be written
The choice of X is then the solution to
Equations (3.8) and (3.9) illustrate the key tension between expected income and expected utility in the face of subsistence requirements. While profits drive harvest stage utility, the planting stage choice of x maximizes expected utility, of which income is only one component. Another important component is the risk associated with the choice of x. While farm profit increases utility, higher x implies large exposure to risk. To limit this exposure, and thus decrease the variation in harvest utility, the village must decrease the choice of x. Thus, the optimal choice of x balances the need for both high income and low exposure to risk. Sinceā > 0 implies DRRA, the inclusion of subsistence requirements can alter the way farmers undertake risky investments under different levels of TFP. After defining equilibrium, I show that this is indeed the case. The inclusion of subsistence requirements interacts with TFP differences and uninsurable risk to generate differences in the domestic intermediate share.
Savings Since subsistence requirements imply DRRA, it is intuitive then that the savings technology can potentially play an important role. Here, I assume that the only savings technology available is costly storage of the agricultural good, and insurance is not available.
The lack of properly functioning insurance markets is certainly not controversial in developing countries. However, there are many ways to save around risk, and savings has been shown to be effective in limiting the impact of risk in Bewley models. This section discusses why this model assumes this primitive savings technology.
First, savings banks are generally not utilized. In addition to paying no interest, Dupas and Robinson (2011) find that rural savings banks in Kenya actually charge both a start-up fee and a variable fee for every transaction. In 12 of 13 developing countries considered, Banerjee and Duflo (2007) find that less than 14% of all people living on under $1 a day have savings accounts.
Most liquid assets are instead accounted for by livestock and grain storage (Udry, 1995; Swinton, 1988) . However, Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1998) show that livestock sales do not seem to be used as a buffer stock in West Africa. This could be due in part to the fact that local markets are poorly integrated, so that local general equilibrium price adjustments make capital goods unable to be used as insurance. Even when they are traded in a way that resembles consumption smoothing, as Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) find in India, there is still severe underinvestment in bullocks. During the same West African drought period considered by Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1998), Reardon, Matlon, and Delgado (1988) point out that cereal stocks were almost completely depleted. This suggests that agricultural output storage is the main form of buffer savings in the poorest countries. As one might suspect, storage technologies are heterogeneous between poor and rich countries.
In Zimbabwe, for example, almost 30% of maize produced is lost due to storage. This is further detailed in the calibration of Section 5.
Equilibrium
Turning now to the equilibrium, I study the stationary competive equilibrium of this economy. This is defined by an invariant distribution µ = µ * , a value function V P , decision rules 
4. The state contingent transfer balances for all (b, z)
5. The law of motion for µ, denoted µ (µ), is such that µ (µ * ) = µ * , and µ * is consistent with Q(z) and decision rules
Analytic Results
This section provides some analytic results to help clarify the mechanics of the interaction between TFP, uninsurable risk, and subsistence requirements. To make these results as sharp as possible, I consider a static version of the model (identically, δ = 1 for all economies).
Within this simplified economy, the model can qualitatively replicate the correlation between intermediate input shares and income detailed in Section 2 if and only ifā > 0. As mentioned previously, the distortions p x and τ are not necessary to generate the result. To show this, I
also assume that τ = 0 and p x = 1 in all economies, so that the only difference between any two model economies is TFP. All proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
To assess the role of risk and incomplete markets, I compare the model to a modified version with complete markets. In the complete markets model (CM economy), villages are allowed to trade a full set of state contingent assets before the realization of z. When these markets are not available (IM economy), production risk translates into consumption risk.
The importance of this fact can can be seen by comparing the first order conditions in the IM and CM economies with respect to x. Because consumption is fully insured against risk with complete markets, farmers maximize expected profit. This implies that the first order condition of the planting problem with respect to x would be
where
However, without the ability to trade these claims (IM economy), the first order condition with respect to x of the village's planting problem yields
dQ(z) = 1 (4.2) Equation (4.1) shows that the profit maximizing farm considers only the arithmetic mean of z 1/(1−η) . This changes with the addition of incomplete markets. Equation (4.2) shows that the village facing risky consumption considers a weighted average of z 1/(1−η) , where the weight is given by the marginal utility at the realization of z relative to the mean (the "utility weight" at z). Those realizations of z that imply a higher than average marginal utility are weighted relatively more heavily by a village that faces uninsurable risk. Similarly, those realizations of z that imply a lower than average marginal utility are weighted less heavily.
Thus, the inclusion of uninsurable risk tilts the weight assigned by every village toward "bad"
outcomes. This leads naturally to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For a given A, the domestic intermediate share is lower in the IM economy than the CM economy. That is,
Graphically, this result can be seen in Figure 4 . In the CM economy, the utility weight is irrelevant. Put somewhat more formally, it is equal to one at every realization of z, and is given by the dotted line at 1. Once consumption risk is tied to production risk, however, this changes. The utility weight at low z realizations increases, causing a decrease in the domestic intermediate share for all TFP levels A, which can be seen in the solid line. The more interesting issue, however, is how the intermediate input share reacts to changes in A, since the empirical evidence of Section 2 suggests they should be correlated. First, with a = 0, uninsurable risk is irrelevant in accounting for the fraction of the labor force in agriculture, the domestic intermediate share, and agricultural productivity differences.
Proposition 2. In the model with uninsurable risk (IM economy) andā = 0, the following results hold:
is independent of A 3. For two economies with TFP levels A 1 and A 2 , productivity differences in the IM economy do not increase relative to the CM economy. That is, Given the theoretical relevance of the interaction between TFP, risk, and subsistence requirements, I now move back to the full dynamic model to investigate the quantitative magnitudes of the results shown here.
Quantitative Exercise and Calibration
The first quantitative experiment is to compare the predictions of the US model economy to to a "poor" country. The second exercise is to vary p x and τ in the poor model economy while holding all other parameters fixed. This helps to understand the complementarity between price distortions and risk. 5 This isolates the direct impact of risk for different levels of price distortions.
Section 5.1 presents the parameters that are the same across economies. Section 5.2 details the differences between the two economies in the baseline calibration, which are TFP A, storage depreciation δ, intermediate input price p x and labor wedge τ . Table 3 lists all the parameters chosen.
Common Parameters
In this section, I detail the parameters that are identical to both economies. They include the production technology (except for TFP), the shock distribution, and utility parameters. (2008) and Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) , who find that this share is about 0.38. Since labor is chosen after the realization of all uncertainty, the parameter η is exactly equal to the payments to labor as a share of gross agricultural output. I choose η = 0.40, which is consistent with the labor share in Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) . Estimates of this parameter, however, vary widely and Section 7 considers the sensitivity of the results to this parameter.
Farm Productivity Shock Distribution There are two possible choices for choosing the shock distribution. The first is to choose two separate shock distributions-one for the USA and a second for the "poor" economy. The second possibility is to assume that the distribution of shocks is the same between the two economies. It turns out that this decision is quantitatively irrelevant. Because the US economy is so far from subsistence, the distribution of shocks is of little quantitative importance. That is, these villages act similar to profit maximizers.
When A decreases however, villages become much more sensitive to this distribution because they are (ex-ante) closer to subsistence. Therefore the distribution is chosen to match the poor economy, and I make the innocuous assumption that the distribution is the same in the rich economy, since the mean is always normalized to one. 
Because TFP in this model remains fixed, I use a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter λ = 6.25, consistent with Ravn and Uhlig (2002) , to detrend z * jt and get values for z vt . Note that E v (z vt ) = 1 for all v by construction. Therefore, I am not biasing the results by assuming average TFP is lower in agriculture than in manufacturing. Since the shock is assumed to be i.i.d. across time and villages, so I can safely assume that each shock realization is drawn from the same distribution.
This procedure generates the discrete empirical probability density function displayed in Figure 5 . 7 In the model, hours and people can be used interchangeably. However, the model's calibration and predictions are matched to data on number of people, not hours. any absolute conclusions about the nature of agricultural risk. However, even within this small sample, notice that while there are some particularly good years, there are also some particularly bad years. Over five percent of the total probability is below z = .25, which seems to be roughly consistent with empirical evidence. Dercon (2002) , for example, finds that 78% of households surveyed in the Ethiopian Rural Panel Data Survey had weather related harvest failure in the preceeding twenty years. Haresaw, a village in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, has rainfall levels less than 40% of the median approximately every ten years (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011) , painting a somewhat more dire picture than here.
The key in this model is that even though P r(z < .25) ≈ .05, farmers in developing countries weight this outcome more heavily than farmers in developed countries. 8 Although the lowest value recovered is z = 0.07, I abstract from shocks that amount to an almost total loss of output. Including them forces the model to also consider malnutrition, since some villages fall below the subsistence requirements. This implies taking a stand on the complicated nature of bequests and family dynamics of rural life in developing countries. This is beyond the scope of this paper.
Utility Parameters Since the model period is a year, I set β = 0.96. The remaining parameters are the weight on agricultural consumption, α, and subsistenceā. The calibration strategy is as follows. First, choose α, then chooseā to match a fraction of the population in agriculture of 2.84% in the US model economy, consistent with empirical evidence.
The magnitude ofā plays a key role in this model since it controls the level of relative risk aversion. The higher the value of α, the lowerā can be chosen to match the employment moment.
Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2009) Given the added importance ofā in this model relative to these models without risk, I
choose to be conservative and set α = 0.02. To match a labor share in agriculture of 2.84%, a = 0.043.
Economy Specific Parameters
The two economies differ along four dimensions: TFP A, depreciation of stored goods δ, tax rate τ , and intermediate input price p x . Recall that p x changes one for one with the relative productiveness of the technology that turns Y m into X.
TFP For the US economy, TFP is normalized to A = 1. I discipline the TFP in the poor country by manufacturing labor productivity. Since manufacturing labor productivity is equal to A, I set A = 0.25 in the poor economy, which is roughly consistent with nonagricultural labor productivity differences between the richest and poorest countries.
Depreciation of Stored Goods
To discipline the deprecation rate of agricultural storage, I use estimates of total storage losses in a number of African countries. Before proceeding to estimates of these storage losses, a distinction must be made between weight and quality losses. Since the model contains no notion of quality, the exact empirical counterpart would be depreciation of the value of agricultural output. However, quality losses are notoriously difficult to measure, since they can depend on consumers' preferences and cultural customs (Boxall, 2001; de Lucia and Assennato, 1994) . Another issue is that quality and weight do not change one for one. For example, Boxall (2001) points out that some insects feed specifically on the germ of grain. While the germ contains less than 5% of the weight, it contains about 50% of the protein content. Thus, while these infestations may not result in huge weight losses, they do make crops less valuable on market. Boxall (2001) posits that including quality losses could increase the loss from insects by 15-30%.
With that caveat in mind, I focus specifically on weight losses. Post-harvest losses in developing countries are mostly generated before crops leave the farm (i.e. drying and storing crops), while losses in developed countries are mostly generated outside the farm gate (i.e. table waste by consumers).
9 In developed countries, the advent of cold chain storage systems prolong storage life, making on-farm storage losses nearly irrelevant. In developing countries, crops are still dried by the sun and stored in the open. To put a number to these losses, I
turn to the African Post Harvest Loss Information System (APHLIS). APHLIS is a network of local experts that aggregates statistics on weight loss into comparable measures across African countries and crops. Table 2 presents the estimated weight loss data for a number of crops in a selection of African countries.
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Given these figures, I set δ = 0.15 in the poor economy. It is worth emphasizing that this is a conservative estimate, as quality losses are not included. Increasing δ further would increase the results. I set δ = 0.03 in the rich economy. Since the rich model economy has little need for precautionary savings, changing this value does not influence the results.
Tax Rate Since the US model economy is assumed frictionless, τ = 0. For the poor model economy, I choose τ = 0.40. This is roughly consistent with differences in labor wedges found in Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) and Vollrath (2009), both of whom study the importance of sectoral wage differences across countries. 
Quantitative Results
The baseline model results are presented in Table 4 . The first two columns presents the model results for the two economies in the world with no production risk (i.e. P r[z = 1] = 1), but still assuming the differences in (p x , τ ) calibrated above. The second set of columns presents the results of the model when production risk takes the form calibrated in Section 5.1. For comparison, the last column contains the statistical counterparts from the data.
The addition of risk amplifies agricultural productivity differences between the two economies by 52% and aggregate productivity differences by 57%, getting significantly closer 11 Though not listed here, the baseline model also predicts a factor of 29.1 difference in value added per worker in agriculture when measured at US prices. This is 65% of the difference of 45 found by Caselli (2005) when measured in a similar manner. I focus here on output per worker because first, it is the relevant denominator when considering the intermediate input share, and second, it takes into account the role of intermediate inputs on labor productivity. 
Interaction Between Risk and Price Distortions
Price distortions can play a major quantitative role in accounting for cross-country productivity differences in models with no risk. This is due to a substitution effect; since the cost of intermediate inputs rises relative to labor, villages substitute labor for intermediate inputs.
Since labor exhibits decreasing returns, this drives down agricultural productivity. Adding uninsurable production risk generates an additional margin -an income effect -through which price distortions can affect productivity. As the intermediate price increases, expected income decreases. Because of subsistence requirements and uninsurable risk, villages limit their exposure to risk by further reducing intermediate input usage. In the model, this
shows up as a decrease in the domestic intermediate input share.
In this section, I set (p x , τ ) = (1, 0) in all economies and repeat the exercise. The first thing to notice is the importance of the substitution effect. This can be seen by comparing the Model: no risk columns in Tables 4 and 5 . Agricultural output per worker differences between the two economies doubles with the introduction of price distortions p x and τ , as emphasized in Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) . Second, adding production risk is of little quantitative importance without price distortions. While the baseline model increases the predictions of agricultural productivity differences by 52 percent, the model with no policies that can significantly decrease the impact of risk, without being subject to the issues that have plagued lending programs, such as moral hazard and high default rates. Recent work on mobile phone transfers has shown that they are able to overcome physical distance issues and act as a type of insurance network (Blumenstock, Eagle, and Fafchamps, 2011 A.1.1 Productivity I am interested a measure of the ninetieth percentile country relative to the tenth percentile country, similar to that used in Caselli (2005) . As a measure of the rich country, I take average of the top ten percent of countries. Listed from largest to smallest income, they are USA, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. As a measure of the "tenth" percentile, I take an average of the countries that make up the bottom fifteen to five percent of countries, as ranked by PPP GDP per capita. They are Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Uganda, Malawi, Chad, Zaire and Niger.
The productivity statistics are taken from Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) . They are derived from PWT and FAO data. These averages imply a factor of 63.66 difference in agricultural output per worker and 23.18 difference in aggregate output per worker. On average, 82% of the population in the poor countries work in agriculture.
A.1.2 Intermediate Input Shares
As in the text, the domestic intermediate share in agriculture of country j is
This measure is not directly reported in Prasada Rao ( Proof. First, it's easy to show that
Define X * be the optimal choice for a farmer facing p R a , but facing no risk. Then the first order condition implies,
Comparing (B.1) and (B.2), proving the proposition is equivalent to proving that at the price p IM a , X R < X * . This can be seen from the first order conditions. The first order condition in the planting problem is
where y(X, z) is total optimal income and F (X) is defined as in the text. Note that F (·) is concave because ψ + η < 1. Now, consider the profit maximizing problem. The first order condition is
Since F (X) is concave, it follows that X IM < X * .
B.2 An Additional Lemma for the Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the result, I first characterize the the equilibrium of an IM economy with TFP A 2 andā = 0 in terms of an economy with TFP A 1 andā = 0. This is done in Lemma 1 below. 
Proof. Two things must be checked for the proposed allocation to be a competitive equilibrium. First, the proposed equilibrium must satisfy the village optimization problem. That is,
a (z)) satisfies the farmer's optimization problem in economy 2. Second, markets must clear. These are considered in turn.
Optimization Problem First I show that the labor choice problem is satisfied. Using the optimal decision rule N a (X, z),
Whenā = 0, the harvesting utility for a given income y can be written as
where Ω = α log(α) + (1 − α) log(1 − α). Denote the income of a farmer who chooses intermediates X and gets hit with shock z in economy 1 as
Then the harvesting utility of a farmer in economy one can be written as
This implies that
For ease of notation, denote
The first order condition for the farmer in economy one is
where F 1 j is the partial derivative of F with respect to input j and N 1 a is the derivative of the labor choice with respect to X for the economy 1 farmer. Plugging in the proposed equilibrium for economy two yields the following relations
The first order condition for a farmer in economy two is
Plugging in the relations found above, and recalling that p
Comparing equations (B.6) and (B.8) implies that since (X 1 , N 1 a (X 1 , z)) solves the farmer's optimization problem in economy 1, (X 2 , N 2 a (X 2 , z)) solves the farmer's optimization problem in economy 2.
Market Clearing Aggregate sector a output for economy j = 1, 2 is
Therefore, at the proposed equilibrium,
For anyā ≥ 0, the total demand for sector a consumption is given by 
First, note that total agricultural output in economy j is given as
Using the fact that N This follows from the fact that, whenā > 0, relative income net of subsistence,
is decreasing in z.
C Calibration of Shocks
The data used was collected by ICRISAT. I use the version that was released by Stefan The goal is to calculate the value of the following inputs at the village level: capital K, agricultural intermediates I, nonagricultural intermediates X, human labor hours N a , and land L. Allowing for some abuse of notation, let these letters also denote the set of all inputs of that type, so K is the set of all capital goods in the economy, for example. by imputing them from the quantity and value of inputs used. Therefore, if input x ∈ X is used at t = 1975, the price I use is
C.1 Prices
where T V and Q are total value and quantity of input x at the plot level. Notice that this implies that if input x is not used every period, I cannot calculate a p v,x,t at every period. Since the prices remain constant over time, I refer to the price of input x in village v as p v,x , dropping the time subscript.
C.2 Construction of Inputs
The data includes 5 inputs: Capital, land, human labor, non-agricultural intermediates, and agricultural intermediates.
C.2.1 Capital
I use class code E, farm equipment and implements and class code M , major farm machinery, and class code R, production capital assets. Class code E includes basic farm equipment such as plows and hoes. Class code M includes major machinery such as tractors and electric pumps.
A key capital component in agriculture is productive animals. Therefore, I also include bullock labor hours at the plot level, both owned and rented bullocks. The value of an hour of an owned bullock is imputed from the rental rates of hired bullock hours, so they are valued equally. Thus, the value of bullock hours on plot p owned by family f in village v at time t is given as where the rental rate r b v is computed using the technique described above. Combining these two values gives the total capital input for production on plot p owned by family f in village v at time t, denoted K f,p,v,t .
K p,f,v,t = k∈K p k,v Q k,f,p,v,t + B f,p,v,t ∀ (p, f, v, t)
C.2.2 Human Labor
The Y files give hours of male, female, and child labor in the data. Since I calibrate to match the fraction of the population over 15 years of age, I include only male and female labor.
Child labor is a small component with the lowest price (i.e. not as productive as an adult laborer). Including it makes no discernible difference. Similar to bullock labor hours, the Y files include disaggregated data on both family and hired workers. Once again though, the value of family labor is imputed from market value, so they are valued equally.
Letting H f and H h denote family and hired hours, the total value of labor on plot 
C.2.5 Land
A key issue with modeling idiosyncratic risk is things that may look like risk for the economic modeler may actually be unmeasured idiosyncratic differences. Since I do not want to include idiosyncratic differences as risk, I include land quality in my construction of land input. To do so, I use plot value in the P S file. This is the value of the land, given as Value of Land (Y-11) in the manual and is 'Rs. 100' per acre. I allow this value to vary over time.
Therefore, I do not assume that each plot has the same value in every period. My measure of land L then is
where T V L p,f,v,t is the total value of plot p owned by farmer f in village v at time t.
C.3 Output
Total value of output is given by summing over output values in the Y files by plot level.
I include both actual production and by-products produced by farming. Since sometimes more than one crop is planted on a plot, I sum over all outputs on the plot. Letting Y denote the possible set of outputs, total output on a given plot is 
C.4 Decomposition of Residuals
As it currently stands, the data are at the (p, f, v, t) level. The next step is to sum over 
